Case 5-2 Disneyland Resort Paris: The Challenges of Cultural Adaptation

Case 5-2 Disneyland Resort Paris: The Challenges of Cultural Adaptation

Disneyland Resort Paris was known as Euro Disney in its first incarnation on the European continent. After its launch in April 1992, many name changes were made with the purpose of distancing the company from bad publicity. After four different name revisions, the Disney Corporation has settled on Disneyland Resort Paris.

The idea of expanding the Disney magic to Europe proved to be a project that involved more attention to marketing than even this advertising giant could handle. Many Europeans did not want the American dreamland to distract their children, economy, and countries from their own homegrown successful entertainment. David Koenig, author of Mouse Tales: A Behind-the-Ears Look at Disneyland, commented, “To the Parisian intellectuals, Disneyland was a symbol of everything contemptible about America: artificial, unstimulating, crass, crude, for the masses. Yet here was a 5,000 acre Disneyland springing up half an hour from the Louvre.”

From the beginning, the Disney Corporation had the best of intentions for its European operation. After the successful opening of Disneyland Tokyo, the company was ready for its next international challenge. The company believed that locating the theme park in close proximity to Paris, France, would both ensure growth for Disney and offer an opportunity for it to incorporate different European cultures. It envisioned a Discoveryland that incorporated the histories of European countries through its fairy tales: Italy for Pinocchio, England for Alice in Wonderland, and France for Sleeping Beauty’s chateau.

In its first incarnation as Euro Disney, the company failed in many aspects of its marketing strategy:

Euro Disney failed to target the many different tastes and preferences of a new continent of more than 300 million people; addressing the needs for visitors from dissimilar countries, such as Norway, Denmark, and Germany, on one hand, and Spain, Italy, and France, on the other, was a challenge.

Disney’s admission costs were 30 percent higher than a DisneyWorld ticket in the United States, and the company refused to offer discounts for winter admissions.

Euro Disney ignored travel lifestyles of Europeans: Europeans are accustomed to taking a few long vacations, rather than several short trips, which would fit with the Disney model. The company also neglected to consider national holidays and traditional breaks when Europeans are more likely to travel.

Its restaurants did not appeal to visitors. Morris Nathanson Design in Rhode Island, which was responsible for designing the restaurants for Euro Disney, designed classic American-style restaurants. Most Europeans consider American-style restaurants as exotic and unusual; unfortunately, the Europeans did not respond well to this format.

Euro Disney assumed that all Europeans wanted gourmet meals, which is not the case. Although French consumers tend to live a more lavish lifestyle and spend larger amounts for gourmet meals, many other consumers in Europe do not—especially when they have to also spend large amounts on air travel, resorts, and park entrance fees. Meal scheduling was also problematic: The French, for example, are accustomed to having all businesses close down at 12:30 for meal times, but the park’s restaurants were not made to accommodate such large influxes for meals, leading to long lines and frustrated visitors. Finally, Euro Disney initially had an alcohol-free policy, which did not fit with local traditions, where wine is an important part of the culture.

Disney’s failed marketing strategy for Euro Disney led to below-average attendance levels and product sales;the park was on the edge of bankruptcy in 1994, with a loss per year of more than a billion dollars. Changing strategies—as well as its name, to Disneyland Resort Paris—led to increased revenues by 2001 of more than 4 percent, with operating revenues increasing by $32 million to $789 million. Net losses also decreased from $35.4 million to $27.6 million.

With a full-scale change in the company’s marketing direction, Disneyland Resort Paris has been successful in attracting visitors from many countries. Access was a priority for Disney. The company worked on access to the park via the fast train—the TGV; it also worked deals with the EuroStar and Le Shuttle train companies. Disney negotiated deals with trains and airlines to reduce prices—a move that ultimately benefited all; the price for transportation to Disney has dropped by 22 percent since the park’s opening. In 1992, the Walt Disney Company negotiated with Air France to make it the “official” Euro Disney carrier. For visitors from the United Kingdom, British Airways is the preferred carrier of Disneyland Resort and British Airways Holidays, its tour subsidiary, is the preferred travel partner.

Disney also adapted targeting strategies to individual markets to address the interests and values of different segments of European consumers. It placed representatives around the world with the task of researching specific groups of consumers and creating the best package deals for potential visitors; new Disney offices were established in London, Frankfurt, Milan, Brussels, Amsterdam, and Madrid. Research results led to the tailoring of package deals that were in line with vacation life-styles of the different European segments. In addition to the package deals, Disney offered discounts for the winter months and half-price discounts for individuals going to the park after 5:00 p.m.

To better accommodate its guests, Disneyland Resort Paris revised its stringent no-alcohol policy, allowing wine and beer to be served at its restaurants. The resort hotels also lowered their room rates and offered less expensive menu choices in their restaurants. The restaurants created more suitable food options, catering to different regional European tastes, but continued to offer large American-size portions. Crepes and waffles are on the menu of almost every street stand in the park.

Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck have French accents, and many rides were renamed to appeal to French visitors: in Adventureland, Le Ventre de la Terre (Galleries under the tree), l’Ile au Tresor (Treasure Island), La Cabane des Robinson (Robinsons’ Cabin); in Fantasyland, Le Chateau de la Belle au Bois Dormant (Sleeping Beauty’s Castle, rather than Cinderella’s Castle at Disney World, United States, Blanche-Neige et les Sept Nains (Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs), Le Carrousel de Lancelot, Le Pays des Contes des Fees; and in Discoveryland, L’Arcade des Visionnaires, Le Visionarium (a time-travel adventure with Jules Verne), Les Mysteres du Nautilus (Nautilus’s Mysteries).

The French-named attractions exist alongside attractions such as Main Street U.S.A., with its Main Street Station, vehicles and horse-drawn streetcars; and Frontierland, with Thunder Mesa River Boat Landing, Legends of the Wild West, Rustler Roundup Shootin’ Gallery, and other similar themes. The hotels also have more traditional American themes—New York, Newport Bay, and Sequoia Lodge.

The park also has numerous attractions that appeal to European guests in general, such as Pinocchio’s Fantastic Journey, and Cinemas Gaumont, which feature live concerts with performers from around the world.

Along with creating an environment of greater appeal to European visitors, Disney changed the name of its resort to Disneyland Resort Paris. In its advertising strategy, the company decided to focus its efforts on brand building, initially targeting consumers with a new communication strategy implemented by Ogilvy & Mather Direct. Disney changed its advertising, aiming its message at Europeans who did not grow up with Mickey Mouse; in the park’s new commercials, parents and grandparents are shown delighting in the happiness of their children and grandchildren. The advertisements feature “children impatient to depart for and thrilled to arrive at the Magic Kingdom or a grandfather delighted by his granddaughter’s excitement at the prospect of seeing Mickey; or grown-ups sitting tensely before riding on the Space Mountain.”

The park is also working with Red Cell, a leading Paris-based advertising agency, for all its television campaigns for the park’s new attractions.

Disney capitalized on its European success by offering yet another grand theme park adjacent to Disneyland—the Walt Disney Studios. Disney promoted Walt Disney Studios in a manner that did not cannibalize attendance at Disneyland Resort Paris. Among its attractions are a Rock’N’Roller Coaster Starring Aerosmith, capitalizing on the U.S. band’s success in Europe; Animagique; and Cinemagique. The park is dedicated to the art of cinema, animation, and television, and it focuses on the efforts of many Europeans who made it possible to bring fantasy to reality.

The Resort has had its ups and downs since the turnaround. After the terrorist attacks of 2001, the number of foreign tourists visiting France fell significantly. And new hotels not owned by Euro Disney are taking away market share from the older Disney hotels. However, more recently, Euro Disney SCA has seen its revenues increase significantly, with sales rising to $364 million in 2006, compared with a year earlier. The theme-park division, its largest activity by sales, experienced an 18 percent revenue increase. This increase was attributed to the launch of the new Toy Story-inspired Buzz Lightyear Laser Blast and to a later-than-usual Easter holiday. The hotel division sales also rose by 14 percent compared with the previous year. However, Euro Disney spending is high, and the company is deeply in the red amid high operating costs and financial charges. It embarked on a program to introduce new attractions and two new rides.

Under the company’s “Where Dreams Come True” initiative, each international Disney resort will present tailored celebratory themes in 2007. Disneyland Resort Paris is celebrating its 15th anniversary, and Tokyo Disney Resort is celebrating its 25th anniversary. Disney toughed it out in France, and its efforts paid off.

(Lascu 163-165)

Lascu, Dana-Nicoleta. International Marketing, 3e,  3rd Edition. Cengage Learning, 02/2008. VitalBook file.